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Heane: Murder--Distinction Between First and Second Degree Inconsistency
STUDENT NOTES AND REGENT GASES
Whether the actual conclusion reached in the principal case
can be justified by an application of the Hearsay Rule is a question not within the purview of this note.
-FLETCHER

MURDER-DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

W. MANN.

FIRST AND SECOND

DEGREE-

INCONSISTENCY IN SOMTE WEST VIRGINIA CASES.-Chapter 144, Section 1 of BAREs' WEST VIRGINIA CODE of 1923, says "Murder by
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
* - [and homicides in the
commission of, or attempt to commit certain enumerated felonies,
(see also chapter 148, see. 13)] * * * is murder of the first degree. All other murder is of the second degree". This act is
based on the Virginia Code of 1860, and the original statute was
enacted much earlier than that. As these two degrees of murder
are statutory and unknown, to the common law, the first inquiry
must be as to what constitutes murde at common law; and having found the answer, the next logical step is to exclude therefrom all that which the legislature has declared to be first degree murder, which leaves, because of the "all other" clause, a
residue of second degree.
For the purposes of this note no attempt at an all inclusive
classification of common law murder need be given, as it is sufficient to state that a killing accompanied by malice aforethought,-malice prepense,-is essential. This proposition is elementary and needs no authority to support it. Malice aforethought is either express or implied, and it is in regard to the
implied malice that. the difficulty arises. It is the former in
cases where the accused has made threats or otherwise expressly
shown malice, and the latter in cases where the surrounding circumstances are such that the killing can only be accounted for on
the supposition of design or intent. Courts applying the rules
of common law in cases involving no degrees of murder have laid
down that when a homicide occurs in the commission of any
felony, or in the resistence of a lawful arrest, the offense is murder even though the killing was unintentional, for there the malice
prepense is implied by law. Regina v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287
(1862); State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578; Boyd v.
State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855) ; Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550,
11 S. W. 651. It has also been held that malice aforethought may
be implied when the act which causes the death is done "deib'
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erately and with the intention of mischief'",-such as conduct
amounting to a reckless disregard of probable fatal consequences,
Ann v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 159 (1850) ; and from the dangerous use of a deadly weapon, Commonwealtih v. Webster, 5
'Cush. (Mass.) 296, 52 Am. Dec. 711 (1850). The malice aforethought need not be of any definite duration in the mind of the
culprit, and it has been held to be sufficient if the malice prepense arises almost simultaneously with the act. State v. Anderson, 2 Tenn. 6, 5 Am. Dec. 648; State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491 at
544 (1860). But if the act is not done deliberately, as for instance, in the heat of passion on sufficient provocation, the offense is but manslaughter. "The question is whether the prisoner had determined to do so." Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817
(1837).
Therefore it would seem that in cases involving felony or resistance to lawful arrest, the instruction to the jury would be to
the effect that if they find certain facts to be true the law implies malice aforethought, and the verdict must be murder; while
in 0 0 0 deaths resulting from wanton and reckless conduct or
dangerous weapons, if the jury finds that certain acts were deliberate, premeditated, and "in a spirit of michief" the malice
prepense will be implied and the crime is murder. If the jury
does not so find, the offense would be manslaughter, if a crime at
all. So it appears that at common law willfullhess, deliberation,
and premeditation, are necessary elements of murder (except in
the felony and arrest cases); although a few border line cases
suggest themselves, as where a workman throws lumber from the
roof of a building in a populous town and inadvertantly kills a
person in the street below. This is nevertheless murder because
of the recklessness of the act, although there is no deliberation. 4
BI, ACKSTONE Coni. 192; Whiteford v. Commonwealth, 6 Rand.
(Va.) 721, 18 Am. Dec. 771 (1828). But it is submitted that such a
case will very seldom arise, for it seems reasonable to suppose that
most workmen in such a predicament must realize the danger of
such an act at the time, and if one does so realize and throws the
lumber anyway it is a deliberate act, for he has decided to take
the chance.
It is therefore submitted, first,-that under our statute second
degree murder can consist of (1) a killing in the course of a
felony not enumerated in section one, (2) a killing in the resistance of a lawful arrest (both of which might also be first degree nmurder, however), and (3) common law murder in a few
possible but seldom arising cases of criminal negligence; and that
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all other homicides must be first degree murder, or voluntary or
involuntary manslaughter, if criminal at all.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as early as 1828, in
Whiteford v. Commonweatltz, supra, seems to have so construed
the statute, in laying down the rule that premeditation and deliberation may occur at any time before the act, however short
such time, and that malice prepense may be inferred from the nature of the acts of the accused, thereby recognizing the common
law view of murder. The Whiteford Case further states that
such homicides "must" be first degree murder, for the crime
would otherwise be manslaughter. Two illustrations of second
degree .murder were cited however, the first being the workman
case already mentioned and the other being a case of a man
shooting at a fowl and killing a person instead. But even this
has been doubted by the Central Criminal Court, the very home
of the common law, in Regina v. Serne, 16 'Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
Two more recent West Virginia cases, affirming convictions of
first degree murder, are to the same effect as the Whiteford Case.
State v. Medley, 66 W. Va. 216, 66 S. E. 358 (1909); State v.
Lemon, 84 W. Va. 25, 99 S. E. 263. It seems clear that the early
Virginia court in construing the statute nmust have felt that second degree murder could not include many kinds of cases, aside
from felony and unlawful arrest homicides, and it is worthy of
note that the two possible cases of second degree murder cited by
the court were such that very seldom will arise. Had the learned
judge contemplated that second degree murder could embrace a
killing by means of the deliberate use of a deadly weapon he
surely would have given such an illustration, for experience shows
that more murders are committed in such a manner than by the
criminal negligence in the two cases cited.
It is submitted, secondlyi-that a number of our West Virginia cases holding that instructions should be given covering
both degrees of murder as well as manslaughter are inconsistent
with the Whiteford Case and with the statute, inasmuch as, from
the facts they 'state, the homicides could be either first degree
murder or manslaughter only, if not justifiable or excusable. For
example, State v. Shamblin, 143 S. E. 230 (W. Va. 1928), also
State v. Banks, 99 W. Va. 711, 129 S. E. 715, wherein a second
degree instruction probably was given as that was the verdict.
There are a number of such cases, all of which greatly extend the
possible scope of second degree murder.
It is submitted, thirdly,-that these inconsistent cases are due
to the rule of law in this state, laid down by the court, that all
murder is presumed to be of the second degree, and that it rests
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on the prosecution to raise the offense to first degree. See State
v. Trail, 59 W. Va. 175, 53 S. E. 17; State v. White, 81 W. Va.
516, 94 S. E. 972. If it is true, as the writer contends, that second degree murder can embrace only a few classes of cases, then
it is obvious that such a presumption is logically unsound. Suppose a case where the only evidence introduced tends to show a
killing by poison or by starvation, how could the presumption be
second degree when the express words of the statute are contra?
Taking this just a step further, it is hard to see how a killing by
the deliberate use of a dangerous weapon, for instance, could be
presumed to be second degree either. The result of the presumption is that two homicides may be committed on the same
day and in the same manner, and under exactly the same circumstances, but by two different persons. In one case the accused might be found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced, to hang by the neck until dead, while in the other case the
prisoner might be rewarded with a home at Mvoundsville for
eighteen years as a guest of the state. It would all depend on
the two juries, for the law would be the same in both cases. Now
if accused number one was guilty of first degree murder, and it
will be assumed that the evidence showed a clear case in both
trials, why should the jury in case number two be told that accused number two might possibly be guilty of only second degree
murder?
It is interesting to note that the presumption of second degree
murder is of recent origin, compared with the age of the statute.
This might be due to change in point of view since the enactment
of section one. Texas has more recently reached by statute the
same general result as our presumption, for in Texas there are
no degrees of murder, but many definitions of what constitutes
criminal homicide, with varying penalties affixed for the different classes, which are based on the manner in which the homicides was committed, extenuating circumstances, etc. PENAL CODE
OF TEXAs, 1925, Articles 1201 thru 1264. In West Virginia the
presumption enables the jury to be guided to some extent by their
sense of justice in that they may return a verdict of first degree
or second degree, depending on how they feel about the case.
From a practical rather than logical viewpoint then, it might well
be that the presumption is sound, for it is a strong argument to
point out, that a conviction of second degree murder is better than
an acquittal when the jury feels that the accused is guilty, but
balks at hanging or life imprisonment.
-J. G. HE.NE~r, in.
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